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I. United States Aviation Regulatory Developments
A. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES BECOMES AN IMMUNIZED MEMBER OF THE STAR
ALLIANCE
The existing Star Alliance includes more than twenty U.S. and foreign airlines, with a
subset of nine members (the Star ATI Alliance) that have authority from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) to coordinate on an immunized basis., Two Star ATI
members, United and Lufthansa, have another alliance agreement (the Atlantic Plus) that
provides for a greater level of integration than found in the arrangements between the
Star ATI members at large, for which DOT has also granted global antitrust immunity
(ATI).2 The recent joint application of Continental and the existing Star ATI carriers
sought Continental's inclusion as the second U.S. member of the Star ATI Alliance agree-
ment on a global basis, as well as ATI for an integrated joint venture within the broader
* The chapter was compiled by Lorraine B. Halloway and Gerald F. Murphy. Lorraine B. Halloway is a
Partner in the Aviation and International Trade Groups and Gerald F. Murphy is Counsel in the Aviation and
Corporate Groups at Crowell & Moring, LLP in Washington, D.C. Section I on United States Aviation
Regulatory Developments was written by Lorraine B. Halloway and Gerald F. Murphy. Section II on the
Liberalization of Foreign Ownership Rules for Canadian Air Carriers was written by Catherine A. Pawluch, a
Partner and Transportation Law National Practice Group Leader at Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP in
Toronto, Canada. Section III on European Aviation Law was written by Leendert Creyf and Catherine
Erkelens, a Partner and a Senior Associate, respectively, in the Aviation & Aerospace Group of Bird & Bird
LLP in Brussels, Belgium. Section IV on Aviation Finance was written by David Hernandez and Erin Spry
Staton. David Hernandez and Erin Spry Staton are a Shareholder and an Associate, respectively, at Vedder
Price P.C. in Washington, D.C. Section V on Developments in European Maritime Law was written by
James H. Bergeron, a Political Advisor with the NATO Striking Force in Naples, Italy (contribution made in bis
personal capacity). Section VI on the "Rotterdam Rules" was written by Mark J. Andrews, Partner-in-Charge
for the Washington, D.C. office of Dallas-based Strasburger & Price, LLP.
1. The Star ATI Alliance now includes Air Canada, Austrian, bmi, Continental, LOT, Lufthansa, SAS,
Swiss, TAP, and United. These carriers are also referred to as the Joint Applicants in this Section 1.
2. R. Bruce Keiner, Jr., Lorraine B. Halloway & Gerald F. Murphy, Airline Alliances, Antitrust Immunity
and Mergers in the United States (2009), available at http://www.crowell.com/documents/airline-alliances-anti-
trust-inmmunity-and-mergers-in-the-us.pdf.
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alliance among Continental, United, Air Canada, and Lufthansa patterned after the im-
munized Atlantic Plus joint venture (the A++ Alliance), providing for those four carriers to
engage in joint pricing, sales and marketing, and revenue sharing on transatlantic routes.
The A++ Alliance is based on the same "metal neutrality" present in the recent SkyTeam II
case,3 and DOT looks with favor on such deep alliances.4 Although DOT previously said
that any proposal to link two major U.S. carriers under a single grant of ATI raises novel
issues,5 its award of antitrust immunity to Delta and Northwest in SkyTeam II set the
precedent for doing so. 6
The DOT's Show-Cause Order tentatively granting ATI found that an expanded im-
munized Star ATI Alliance that included Continental would have "substantial public bene-
fits" such as:
(1) an expanded network, serving many new cities; (2) new online service, which in-
cludes the likelihood of new routes and expanded capacity on existing routes; (3)
enhanced service options, such as more routings, reduced travel times, expanded non-
stop service in select markets, new fare products, and integrated corporate con-
tracting and travel incentives; (4) enhanced competition due to the addition of a
major new gateway, Newark, as well as the elimination of multiple mark-ups on code-
share segments, and more vigorous competition between the alliances; (5) cost effi-
ciencies; and (6) a strengthened financial position for the carriers.7
DOT determined that these benefits will be achieved without a substantial reduction in
competition because the Joint Applicants' networks are complementary, rather than over-
lapping, and the addition of Continental's market share to that of the existing Star ATI
Alliance carriers would not "materially alter the current competitive landscape or increase
overall market share to any significant degree."
The Star ATI Alliance expansion was not without controversy; however, since the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) submitted formal comments on the application nearly three
months after DOT issued a show-cause order tentatively approving it.9 Recognizing the
3. See DOT Final Order 2008-5-32, Joint Application of Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-S.p.A., et al.,
Docket DOT-OST-2007-28644-0185 (May 22, 2008), available at http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/
contentStreamer?objectId=09000064805f928a&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
4. See, e.g., DOT Show Cause Order 2008-4-17, Joint Application of Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-S.pA.,
et al., Docket DOT-OST-2007-28644-0174, 15 (Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId-090000648048195b&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf
5. DOT Order Establishing Procedural Schedule 2005-6-1, Joint Application of Alitalia-Linee Aeree
Italiane-S.pA., et al., Docket DOT-2004-19214-0086, 2 (June 1, 2005) (citing Order 2004-11-15, Joint Ap-
plication of Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-S.p.A., et al., Docket DOT-2004-19214-0023, 4 (Nov. 18, 2004),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064802c23cf&disposi-
tion=attachment&contentType=pdf.
6. DOT Final Order, supra note 3, at 1.
7. DOT Show Cause Order 2009-4-5,Joint Application of Air Canada, et al. [Expanded Star Application],
Docket DOT-OST-2008-0234-0193, 18-19 (Apr. 7, 2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/search/
Regs/contentStreamerobjectld=09000064809473d6&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf
8. Id. at 8. Continental itself accounts for only 2.7% of available seats. See OAG Worldwide (Mar. 2009).
There is less overlap and more network expansion with Continental/United/Star than with Delta/Northwest/
SkyTeam.
9. See DOT Notice Establishing a Supplemental Comment Period, Expanded Star Application, Docket
DOT-OST-2008-0234-0241 (June 26, 2009), available at http-//www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/
contentStreamer?objectld=09000064809e208a&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
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last two decades of DOT decisions granting antitrust immunity to the largest airlines in
the world but apparently ignoring that SkyTeam II immunity had been granted after the
U.S.-EU agreement became effective, DOJ suggested that the door on antitrust immunity
should be shut once the homelands of foreign alliance members sign such an open skies
agreement.IO Contrary to DOT's analysis and conclusions in the show-cause order, DOJ
contended that DOT should deny global ATI to Continental's Star activities, impose
carve-outs for certain transatlantic and transborder routes, and continue existing United/
Lufthansa carve-outs.II The Joint Applicants vigorously objected to DOJ's contentions,
urging DOT to finalize its show-cause order "with all deliberate speed."l 2 American also
commented, raising "serious concerns about DOJ's request that the Department depart
from the precedent set in the SkyTeam II docket" by asking DOT "to retreat from its
alliance policy."' 3
On July 10, 2009, DOT made final its tentative findings in the show-cause order and
approved the alliance agreements adding Continental to the existing Star ATI Alliance,
and within that broader alliance, approved the integrated A++ joint venture agreement
involving Air Canada, Continental, Lufthansa, and United.' 4 The approval, which granted
ATI on a global basis as requested, added the same reporting requirements recently ap-
plied to the SkyTeam alliance, required implementation of the A++ joint venture within
eighteen months, and imposed some (but not all) of the carve-outs that had been sought
by DOJ, although those carve-outs automatically terminate within nine months of new
entry on carved-out routes.'5 DOT rejected DOJ's suggestion that because the United
States has an open skies agreement with the European Union, U.S. foreign policy goals
would no longer be served by granting the Continental/Star application, as well as DOT's
contention that the Joint Applicants would proceed without immunity.'6 DOT also re-
fused to restrict the global grant of immunity, as DOJ had requested by DOJ.17 Instead,
DOT found "that granting immunity beyond transatlantic markets will enhance the abil-
ity of immunized Star carriers to cooperate globally outside of the joint venture and will
10. See Public Version Comments of the Department ofJustice on the Show Cause Order, Expanded Star Applica-
tion, Docket DOT-OST-2008-0234-0239, 1-2 (une 26, 2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064809e2512&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
11. See Response of the Joint Applicants to Comments of Dep't of Justice, Expanded Star Application, Docket
DOT-OST-2008-0234-0247, 49 (uly 6, 2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/searchlRegs/
contentStreamer?objectld=09000064809ea990&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
12. Id.
13. Response ofAmerican to Comments of Dep't ofJustice, Expanded Star Application, Docket supra note 11; see
Application ofAmerican Airlines, Inc., et al., Docket DOT-OST-2008-0252, available at http://www.regulations.
gov/search/Regs/home.html#docketDetail?R=DOT-OST-2008-0252.
14. See Final Order 2009-7-10, Extended Star Application, Docket DOT-OST-2008-0234-0253, 2, 18-21
(uly 10, 2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/searchlRegs/contentStreamer?objectd=09000064809
eda55&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (noting DOT did NOT adopt carve-outs in the New
York-Zurich, New York-Halifax, or U.S.-Hong Kong markets sought by DOJ).
15. See id. (the new service must also be nonstop and consist of at least five weekly roundtrips).
16. See id. at 4.
17. Id. at 22. DOT also found it inappropriate to address the United ALPA Master Executive Council's
(MEC) suggestion of requiring a revenue-sharing formula under which the revenue taken by any U.S. carrier
closely correlate to that carrier's share of the pooled capacity, since other parties had not had a chance to
address it.
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assist the Joint Applicants in their efforts to formulate joint ventures in other regions of
their combined networks, thereby promoting greater service benefits to consumers."' 8
B. RESCISSION OF THE CONTROVERSIAL SLOT AUCTION RULES FOR TIHE NEW
YORK METROPOLITAN AREA AIRPORTS
On March 11, 2009, President Obama signed legislation prohibiting the Secretary of
Transportation from issuing rules that involve auctioning rights or permission to conduct
airline operations or withdrawing such rights,19 following the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit decision staying the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) controversial slot auc-
tion rules for New York airports that had generated administrative and judicial challenges
from individual airlines, the Air Transport Association of America, the International Air
Transport Association, and the Port Authority of New York and NewJersey. 20 In October
2009, FAA rescinded the slot auction proposals that had led to the multi-carrier, multi-
forum legal challenges. 21
The rescission ended a bitter multi-venue battle with FAA/DOT that began in August
2008, after the FAA ignored the positions of virtually all industry stakeholders, as well as
the agency's previous acknowledgement that it lacked authority to conduct slot auctions,
and instead proposed to auction the slots that became available at Newark Liberty Inter-
national Airport because business-class airline EOS ceased operations. 22 In issuing a solic-
itation to "lease" the slots to the highest bidder, the agency relied on its claimed
"procurement" authority. 23 This led airlines and aviation trade associations to lodge bid
protests before FAA's Office of Dispute Resolution for Acquisitions (ODRA), which
granted their request for a stay.24 Although ODRA subsequently vacated the stay and
approved the auction process, the General Accountability Office ruled that FAA would
violate the Anti-Deficiency Act by auctioning the slots, because it would be collecting and
spending funds without authority to do so from the Congress.25 The FAA eventually
abandoned the effort to auction the EOS slots and instead issued the controversial conges-
tion management rules for the New York metropolitan airports that led to the D.C. Cir-
cuit challenge.26
II. Liberalization of Foreign Ownership Rules for Canadian Air Carriers
Amendments made to the Canada Transportation Act (the Act) in March 2009 have
provided the Governor in Council (effectively the Federal Cabinet) with flexibility to in-
crease the foreign ownership limit on Canadian carriers from the existing level of twenty-
18. Id.
19. See Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524 (2009).
20. See Port Auth. of N.Y. and NJ. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., No. 08-1329, 2009 WL 3568661 (D.C. Cir.
Oct. 14, 2008).




25. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1990).
26. See 73 Fed. Reg. 60, 544 (Oct. 10, 2008) (JFK/Newark); 73 Fed. Reg. 60, 574 (Oct. 10, 2008)
(LaGuardia).
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five percent to a maximum of forty-nine percent. The impetus for these amendments, it is
suggested, were the recommendations made by the Competition Policy Review Panel (the
Panel), which was established in 2007 by the Minister of Industry and given the mandate
to "examine and report on the laws and policies that will underpin Canada's continued
economic growth and development."27
The focal point of the Panel's inquiry was sectoral restrictions on foreign direct invest-
ment in Canada. With respect to Canada's air transport regime, the Panel made specific
recommendations in connection with increasing the limit of foreign ownership on Cana-
dian air carriers, moving forward to complete the "Open Skies" negotiations with the
European Union, and interestingly, considering a right of establishment regime.28 The
Panel's recommendations with respect to the air transport sector were as follows:
* The Minister of Transport should increase the limit of foreign ownership of air carri-
ers to forty-nine percent of voting equity on a reciprocal basis through bilateral
negotiations.
* The Minister of Transport should complete open skies negotiations with the Euro-
pean Union as quickly as possible.
* The Minister of Transport, on the basis of public consultations, should issue a policy
statement by December 2009 on whether foreign investors should be permitted to
establish separate Canadian-incorporated domestic air carriers using Canadian facili-
ties and labour.29
On the latter point, the Panel observed that there is a trend internationally towards
greater liberalization of domestic aviation markets and urged consideration of "right of
establishment" carriers, that is, permitting 100% foreign ownership for carriers offering
only domestic services. 30 Notably, the Panel did not accept the urgings of the Commis-
sioner of Competition that the law should be changed to unilaterally open up Canada's
airline industry to foreigners and permit "cabotage" (i.e., allowing a foreign carrier to fly
point-to-point within Canada).3'
In line with the Panel's recommendation on the foreign ownership of Canadian carriers,
the Act has been amended to allow the Governor in Council to pass regulations that
would permit non-Canadians to own and control up to forty-nine percent of the voting
interests of a Canadian air carrier (an increase from twenty-five percent). 32 This is subject
to the requirement that the Canadian carrier be controlled, in fact, by Canadians.33 Non-
Canadians will continue to have the right to hold non-voting interests, again, as long as
the air carrier is controlled, in fact, by Canadians.34





31. As of the date of this writing, the Minister of Transport has not acted on the Panel's right of establish-
ment recommendation. It remains to be seen whether Canada will follow the lead of Australia and New
Zealand to permit right of establishment carriers.
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The Act does not define what is meant by the term "controlled, in fact, by Canadi-
ans."35 Its meaning has been the subject matter of frequent and, often times, lengthy
proceedings before the Canadian Transportation Agency, a quasi-judicial tribunal respon-
sible for the enforcement of the Act.
One unique aspect of the amended legislation is a new provision that allows the Gover-
nor in Council to specify classes of non-Canadians and specify a percentage of voting
interests that may be owned and controlled by such class of non-Canadians, subject to the
forty-nine limit on foreign ownership and to the requirement that the air carrier is con-
trolled, in fact, by Canadians.36
The definition of "Canadian" under the Act includes:
a corporation or any other entity incorporated or formed under the laws of Canada or
a province, that is controlled in fact by Canadians where the percentage of voting
interests owned and controlled by non-Canadians is not more than: (a) in respect of
all non-Canadians, the percentage specified in the regulations, or (b) in respect of any
class of non-Canadians specified in the regulations, the percentage specified in the
regulations in respect of that class.37
Section 55.1 of the Act has been added in order that the Governor in Council may, by
regulation, (i) specify a percentage for the purpose of paragraph (a) of the definition "Ca-
nadian" in subsection 55(1), which percentage may not be more than forty-nine percent;
and (ii) for the purpose of paragraph (b) of that definition, specify classes of non-Canadi-
ans and specify a percentage with respect to each such class, which percentage may not be
more than forty-nine percent.38 This provision effectively allows the Federal Cabinet to
decide, presumably on a reciprocal basis, whether to permit certain foreign nationals to
own up to forty-nine percent of voting equity in a Canadian carrier. To date, regulations
giving effect to these amendments have not been passed.
With the implementation of the Canada-EU Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement
expected in 2010, the statutory framework is now in place to give effect to the provisions
of the Agreement, permitting nationals of each party to own up to forty-nine percent of
the voting equity of the other party's airlines. Thus, there is an increased possibility of
seeing new regulations that would allow European investors to own up to forty-nine per-
cent of a Canadian carrier's voting interests. The question remains whether the require-
ment that a Canadian air carrier be controlled, in fact, by Canadians will act as a barrier to
the equity participation of foreign investors in Canada's airlines and effectively diminish
the impact of the new foreign ownership laws. To a large extent, this will depend on the
Canadian Transportation Agency's determination as to whether an air carrier meets the
"controlled, in fact, by Canadians" test under the Act.39 It remains to be seen whether the
promise of liberalized ownership rules and the benefits of greater access to foreign capital
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III. European Aviation Law
A. EiussIONs TRADING SCHEME FOR AVIATION ACTIVITIES
On November 19, 2008, the European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive
2008/101/EC with a view of bringing aviation activities within the scope of the existing
greenhouse gas Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) of the European Community.40 Direc-
tive 2008/101 entered into force on February 2, 2009 and allows the Member States until
February 2, 2010 to implement, where necessary, national laws and regulations.4'
The above-referenced legislation provided that the ETS is due to begin in 2012. At
that time, the aviation sector shall receive emission allowances equal to ninety-seven per-
cent of the so-called historical aviation emissions, i.e., an average of the total aviation
emissions produced during the calendar years 2004, 2005, and 2006.42 That number shall
then later be reduced (e.g., to ninety-five percent of historical aviation emissions for 2013).
In 2012, eighty-five percent of the emission allowances granted to the aviation sector shall
be allocated free of charge and the remainder is to be auctioned. 43 The portion of al-
lowances to be auctioned can be increased in future years, thereby providing a financial
incentive to aircraft operators to reduce emissions. The ETS is not limited to aircraft
operators having an air operator certificate (AOC) issued by a European Member State,
rather, any aircraft operator performing flights that depart from or arrive at an airport
situated in a European member state, will be subjected to it.44
Although the ETS will not formally begin until 2012, aircraft operators have obliga-
tions during the so-called 'pre-trading' years 2010 and 2011. These obligations are-in
short-the reporting of verified tonne-kilometre data to their administering authority.45
Based on this data, the aircraft operator will receive its free emission allowances as of
January 1, 2012. In order to be able to report data for 2010, aircraft operators had to
submit a monitoring plan to their administering authority by August 31, 2009.46
The administering authorities are organized at member state level. Aircraft operators
that have a European AOC are administered by the authority of the member state that
also issued their AOC. Non-European aircraft operators are allocated to the member
state in which they produce the greatest estimated aviation emissions.47 On August 5,
40. See Council Directive No. 2008/101, OJ. L 8/3 (2009) (amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to in-
clude aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:008:0003:0003:EN:PDF.
41. See Council Directive 2003/87, OJ. 275/ 32 (2003) (establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission





45. See generally European Commission, Environment-Climate Change-Living with Climate Change in Europe,
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/aviation/index en.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2010) (containing more
information on the ETS and guidance on the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification obligations imposed on
aircraft operators).
46. Id.
47. See Commission Regulation 748/2009, OJ. 219/1 (2009) (on the list of aircraft operators which per-
formed an aviation activity listed in Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC on or after 1 January 2006 specifying
the administering Member State for each aircraft operator), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:219:0001:0094:EN:PDF.
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2009, the European Commission adopted Commission Regulation No. 748/2009 specify-
ing the administering member state for both EU and non-EU aircraft operators.48
B. AIRPORT CHARGES AND SECURITY CHARGES
On March 11, 2009, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a directive on
airport charges that sets common principles for the levying of airport charges at Commu-
nity airports.49 The directive requires member states to adopt legislation by March 15,
2011, in order to ensure that airport charges are set and levied in a transparent and non-
discriminatory manner.50 Also, procedures for regular consultation between airport man-
aging bodies and airport users must be set up, as well as remedies in case of dispute.5 In
each member state, an independent supervisory authority will also have to be estab-
lished. 52 The provisions of the directive will have to be applied at Community airports
with an annual traffic of over five million passenger movements and, should this threshold
not be reached, at the airport with the highest passenger movement in each member
state.
5 3
In the legislative process leading up to the airport charge directive on airport charges,
any provision on security charges levied by airports was omitted, as there was political
disagreement on the question of financing security measures. 54 The European Commis-
sion was requested to first investigate and report on the financing before any legislative
initiatives on security charges could be considered. In its report, the Commission con-
cluded, inter alia, that aviation security is essentially a state responsibility, which, however,
does not necessarily mean that security measures should be publicly financed.55 But, when
upholding this user pays-principle, it is important that security charges do not discrimi-
nate and are used exclusively to meet security costs.
In line with these conclusions, on May 11, 2009, the European Commission adopted a
proposal for a directive on aviation security charges, which would codify the application of
the principles of non-discrimination, consultation, transparency, and cost-relatedness to
security charges.56 Security charges are defined as levies specifically designed to recover
all or part of the cost of security measures intended to protect civil aviation against acts of
48. Id.






54. Id.; This resulted in the inclusion of Article 22 of Regulation No 300/2008/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation security and
repealing Regulation No. 2320/2002 (EC), Oj. (L 97) 9.4.2008 (72) (EC), requiring the European Commis-
sion to report, no later than 31 December 2008, on the principles of the financing of the costs of civil aviation
security measures.
55. See REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON FINANCING AVIATION SECURITY, COM (2009) 30 (final) 9
(2009), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0030:FIN:EN:PDF.
56. CoMMssioN PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTiVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
ON AVIATION SECURITY CHARGES, COM (2009) 217 (final) 3-4 (2009), available at http-//eur-lex.europa.eu/
InxUriSenr/LexUriSery.douri=COM:2009:0217:FIN:EN:PDF.
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unlawful interference.s 7 The proposal follows the template of Directive 2009/12/EC on
airport charges, as it requires consultation between airport managing bodies and airport
users, obliges airport managing bodies to provide information, and imposes the establish-
ment of an independent supervisory authority.5 But, unlike Directive 2009/12/EC, the
provisions on security charges would apply to all airports. The Commission's proposal on
security charges is now navigating its way through the legislative process.
C. INTERNATIONAL AVIATION: AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT WITH CANADA
On May 6, 2009, the final text of the Agreement on Air Transport between Canada and
the European Community and its member states, previously endorsed by the Council, was
marked.59 When it enters into force, it will replace all existing bilateral air transport
agreements between Canada and individual European member states. The Air Transport
Agreement with Canada covers all aspects of international aviation, including foreign in-
vestment. It provides for the phased market opening (i.e., traffic rights) linked to the
granting of greater investment freedoms by both sides,60
The opening of the market and the freedom of investment will be realized in four
phases. First, airlines are to be given unlimited freedom to operate direct services between
the European Union and Canada. 61 The second phase will be triggered when Canadian
legislation allows foreign ownership up to forty-nine percent and will result in the grant-
ing of seventh freedom rights to cargo operators. 62 The third phase will begin when both
parties allow each other's nationals the right of establishment with respect to new air
carriers in their territories and will have as consequence the granting of fifth freedom
rights to passenger airlines without limitations on frequency. 63 Finally, the fourth phase
will start when both parties reciprocally allow the full ownership and control of their
airlines by nationals of the other party.64 In this phase, airlines would be granted full
rights to operate between, within and beyond both markets, including "cabotage."
D. SINGLE EURoPEAN SKY AND SESAR
In 2009, both the European Parliament and the Council debated and approved a legis-
lative package 65 proposed by the European Commission (Single European Sky II)66 with a
57. Id.
58. Id.







65. See Press Release, European Commission, The Commission welcomes today's decision of the Euro-
pean Parliament to support the Single European Sky package, IP/09/477 (Mar. 25, 2009), available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.doreference=IP/09/477; Press Release, European Commission, The
Commission welcomes today's political endorsement by the Council of the Single European Sky package, IP/
09/501 (Mar. 30 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/501&for-
mat=HTML&aged-0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
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view on boosting the Single European Sky initiative, which, since the adoption of the first
legislation in 2004,67 was found not to have achieved sufficient results in all areas.68
The legislative package will impose performance criteria for air navigation services (e.g.,
pertaining to delays) and establish independent supervisory bodies to monitor compli-
ance. 69 A fixed deadline-two years after the new legislation becomes effective-is also set
for the implementation of so-called "Functional Airspace Blocks," i.e., the organization of
airspace based on operational requirements rather than on existing national borders. 70
The setting-up of a rational European route network to create shorter routes for intra-
Community traffic is also envisioned. The legislative package extends the competencies of
the European Aviation Safety Agency to oversee aerodromes, air traffic management, and
air navigation services.
The technological arm of the Single European Sky initiative, the Single European Sky
ATM Research program (SESAR) also made substantial progress, moving from the "defi-
nition phase" to the "development phase" following the endorsement by the Council on
March 30, 2009 of the European Air Traffic Management Master Plan. 71 This Master
Plan is the final result of the SESAR definition phase and defines the work program for
the implementation of the target concepts. The necessary technology will now be devel-
oped during the development phase (running until 2013).
To manage the research, the development and validation activities of the SESAR project
and the related public and private sector funding that has been made available were used
to set up the SESAR Joint Undertaking. 72 The SESAR Joint Undertaking brings together
the European Commission, Eurocontrol, and parties active in relevant industries. Mem-
bership is open to public or private undertakings that can demonstrate knowledge and
experience with air traffic management (ATM) or manufacture of equipment or services in
ATM, including third countries that have concluded at least one air transport agreement
with the European Community.7 3 On June 12, 2009, the SESAR Joint Undertaking final-
ized the conclusion of membership agreements with sixteen partners, which also marked
the beginning of its working program. 74 The cost of the development phase managed by
the SESAR Joint Undertaking is estimated at 300 million euros per year to be shared in
equal parts between the European Community, Eurocontrol, and the industry.75
66. See COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL,
THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC AND SocIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE ON THE REGIONS: SINGLE
EUROPEAN SKY II-TOWARDS MORE SUSTAINABLE AND BETTER PERFORMING AVIATION, COM (2008) 389
(final) (2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/transportair portal/traffic-management/ses2/doc/communica-
tion/com_2008_0389_Ilcommunciation-en.pdf.
67. See, e.g., Regulation (EC) No 549/2004, 2004 O.J. (L96) 1, available at http-I/eur-lex.europa.eu/
JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:096:SOM:EN:HTML; Regulation (EC) No 550/2004, 2004 OJ. (L96) 10; Regu-
lation (EC) No 551/2004, 2004 O.J. (L96) 20; Regulation (EC) No 552/2004, 2004 OJ. (L96) 26.
68. See COM (2007) 845 (final) 7 (2007), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=COM:2007:0845:FIN:EN:PDF.
69. See Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 supra note 67; COM (2007) 845, supra note 68.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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E. SLOTS-IMPACT OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS
On March 10, 2009, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal to tem-
porarily relax the so-called use-it-or-lose-it rule applicable to slots.76 This rule requires
carriers to use their series of slots for at least eighty percent of the time during a season in
order to receive those slots again for the following relevant season.77 The Commission
noted that the economic and financial crisis had caused significant reductions in air traffic
over the winter 2008/09 scheduling season and determined that the 2009 summer season
would equally be affected.78 Therefore, the Commission wanted to avoid airlines keeping
capacity at existing levels in the face of reduced demand simply in order to maintain the
"grandfather status" of slots.7 9 The proposal swiftly passed through the legislative pro-
cess; Regulation No 545/2009 was adopted on June 18, 2009, prescribing a new provision
establishing that air carriers would be entitled to the same series of slots for the summer
2010 scheduling period as allocated to them at the start of the summer 2009 scheduling
period.80
IV. Challenges in Aviation Finance
The year 2009 challenged almost every sector of the economy, including aviation. The
global economic meltdown resulted in tight credit markets, weak passenger and freight
traffic, and cancelations or deferrals of aircraft deliveries. As result of the departure of
traditional European and American financiers from the aviation finance sector, Chinese
and Middle Eastern banks and financiers are becoming increasingly active in aircraft fi-
nance and filling the void. For example, Chinese and Middle Eastern entities replaced
several financing deals originally planned for European export credit agencies.
Airlines took measures to save costs and preserve profits, including cutting jobs, reduc-
ing or eliminating flying capacity on certain routes, and cancelling or delaying delivery of
certain aircraft. For instance, Qantas Airlines announced in April 2009 that it would defer
the delivery of four Airbus A380s by ten to twelve months and twelve Boeing 737-800s for
an average of fourteen months and was also understood to be in talks with Boeing to
reduce its order of 787-8 aircrafts over the near term.8' Additionally, it has been an-
76. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation
(EEC) No 95/93 on Common Rules for the Allocation of Slots at Community Airports, COM (2009) 121
(final) 2-3 (2009), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/com/
comcom%282009%290121_/com_com%282009%290121_en.pdf.
77. See Council Regulation 95/93, OJ. 14/1 (1993) (on Common Rules for the Allocation of Slots at Com-
munity Airports), art. 10 (2)-(3), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:31993R0095:EN:HTML.
78. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation
(EEC) No 95/93, supra note 76.
79. Id.
80. See Council Regulation 545/2009, OJ. 167/24 (2009) (amending Regulation No. 95/93 (EEC) on com-
mon rules for the allocation of slots at community airports), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:167:0024:0025:EN:PDF.
81. See Siva Govindasamy, Qantas Defers A380 Deliveries as Economic Conditions Worsen, An TRANs. INTEL-
LIGENCE NEws, Apr. 14, 2009, http://www.flightglobal.con/articles/2009/04/14/325076/qantas-defers-
a380-deliveries-as-economic-conditions.htnl.
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nounced that AirAsia will defer a full third, or sixteen out of forty-eight, of its aircraft
deliveries scheduled over the next two years.82
Even airlines desiring to expand their fleets had difficulty obtaining financing. In addi-
tion to financial institutions having decreased liquidity, credit requirements became
tighter and required more due diligence. Without traditional financing options, airlines
have to increase their leasing activity and export credit agencies, such as the Export-Im-
port Bank of the United States (Ex-Im), played an increased role in facilitating aircraft
financing transactions. Ex-Im expects to finance $8.5 billion in commercial aircraft by the
end of 2009, and anticipates a similar need in 2010, even though credit markets are loos-
ening. 83 This financing was an increase over Ex-Im's financing of only $5.5 billion of
commercial aircraft transactions in 2008.84 Along with Ex-Im, export credit agencies in
the European Union, Canada, and Brazil also increased their roles in facilitating aircraft
financings.85
However, a silver lining exists to the tightened credit market of the past year's economic
climate. As the global economy continues to recover, the availability of financing will
continue to increase. Demand will also increase, and there is already some evidence of
airlines beginning to re-enter the market-perhaps marking the start of a slow upward
trajectory of market recovery. For instance, speaking in advance of November 2009's
Dubai Air Show, Emirates Airlines indicated that it is looking to increase its order of
Airbus A380 superjumbo aircraft beyond the fifty-eight it has already requested. 86 Then,
at the Air Show, Airbus President and Chief Executive Tom Enders said, "[w]e all believe
2010 and 2011 will be still quite challenging; [b]ut I think particularly this air show is
encouraging. . .for seeing that there is growth, particularly in the Middle East, in
Africa."87
V. Developments in European Union Maritime Law
Major European Union developments in maritime transport occurred in 2009. These
included the Third Maritime Safety Package, European Commission efforts to encourage
shipping management companies through tax relief, and efforts to enforce port state rules
and responsibilities.
82. See AirAsia Delays Delivery of 8 Airbus Planes, MANUFACTURING.NET, Oct. 5, 2009, http://www.manu-
facturing.net/News-AirAsia-Delays-Delivery-Of-8-Airbus-Planes- 100509.aspx?menuid=246.
83. See Ann Keeton, U.S. Er-Im Bank Expects to Add to Aircraft Loan Portfolio, MARKErHwvrcH, Sept. 26,
2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-ex-im-bank-expects-to-add-to-aircraft-loan-portfolio-2009-09-
26.
84. See Erport-Import Bank 'Best Game in Town' as Banks Retreat, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 16,
2009. http://www.smh.com.au/business/world-business/exportimport-bank-best-game-in-town-as-banks-re-
treat-20090416-a7po.html.
85. Keeton, supra note 83.
86. See Adam Schreck, Emirates Mulls More Airbus A380s Despite Delays, Los ANGELEs DAILY NEWS, Nov.
11, 2009, http://www.dailynews.com/ci_13763318.
87. See Adam Schreck, Ethiopian Airlines Orden 12 Airbus A350 XWB Aircraft in First Deal at Dubai Airsbow,
S.F. EXAAUNER, Nov. 15, 2009, http-//www.sfexaminer.com/economy/ap/70136342.html?c=y.
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A. Tn THiD MARYTimE SAFETY PACKAGE
On April 23, 2009, the European Union adopted its Third Maritime Safety Package.
Building on the ERIKA I and ERIKA II packages of regulation, the 2009 reforms seek to
make EU rules more effective in preventing maritime accidents and to better manage the
consequences of accidents that nevertheless occur. The package represents a major ex-
pansion of EU law in the area of maritime safety.
Directive 2009/21/EC is intended to improve the quality control that EU member
states have over vessels bearing their flags, thus improving the "brand image" of European
flag states as a whole.88 The Directive requires that all EU member states effectively
verify that international standards are upheld by ships flying their flag.89 In particular, no
member state should be blacklisted or on the grey-list pursuant to the Paris Memorandum
of Understanding on Port State Control. In 2009, however, Austria, Bulgaria, Lithuania,
Latvia, Poland, and Romania were on the grey-list, while Slovakia was blacklisted. The
EU member states have stated a goal of having all EU states 'white-listed' by 2012. The
Directive requires that member states implement laws that will ensure that ships flying
their flag conform to international standards and ensure that any such ships that are de-
tained following a port-state inspection will be brought into line with relevant interna-
tional standards.90 States whose flags are blacklisted or grey-listed for two consecutive
years must explain the reasons for their poor performance to the Commission.91 The
Directive also makes mandatory within the European Union the International Maritime
Organization's (IMO) seven-yearly audit scheme and the application of the IMO Flag
State Code. 92 Obligations will be created to ensure that safety information on flagged
ships is easily accessible. Audit plans of national maritime administrations will become
mandatory. The deadline for national implementation is June 17, 2011.93
Regulation 391/2009 and Directive 2009/15/EC establish a new regime for European
ship inspection, survey, and certification organizations, replacing Directive 94/57/EC.9
Under the directive, which must be implemented by June 17, 2011, an independent, joint
body will be established by the certification organizations themselves to audit and certify
their quality management systems. Under Regulation 391/2009, the Commission may
impose interim protective measures, periodic penalty payments and fines for serious
breaches-up to five percent of the average annual turnover of the organization for re-
lated activities. 95 The European Court ofJustice will have unlimited jurisdiction to review
fines. The Commission can also revoke recognition of organizations if safety can no
longer be guaranteed. A system of mutual recognition will also be established whereby
recognized organizations must recognize the certificates of other organizations whenever
issued on the basis of equivalent technical standards.96






94. See Council Directive No. 2009/15, OJ. L 131/11 (2009); see also Council Regulation No. 391/2009
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Directive 2009/16/EC is intended to improve the quality and effectiveness of inspec-
tions carried out by the port state in European ports, while focusing efforts on offenders
and lessening the regulatory burden on high-quality ships.97 Current European law re-
quires that a member state inspect twenty-five percent of the ships calling in its ports.
This directive now establishes an objective of 100% inspections for the entire Commu-
nity.98 This will include ships making stopovers or anchorages, and ships that rarely visit
the European Union. Inspections will vary depending on the risk the ships pose, with
ships considered the most dangerous to be inspected every six months, ships of average
risk annually, and low-risk ships every three years.99 Risk will be defined by age, type,
flag, company past performance, and record of previous detentions. This Directive 2009/
16/EC also creates powers to ban ships and categories of ships from European waters,
including a permanent ban for ships that repeatedly breach inspection rules and standards,
typically after three temporary bans. The provisions of this directive enter into force on
January 1, 2011.
Directive 2009/17/EC modifies the Community vessel traffic monitoring and informa-
tion system to better assist ships in distress.0o The directive establishes a precise legal
framework to designate refuge zones by mandating that each member state establish an
authority capable of deciding on refuge for ships in distress. Of note, Directive 2009/17/
EC specifies that lack of insurance shall not justify denying refuge to ships in distress. 01
In the area of monitoring, the Directive specifies that the European Union's Safe Sea
Network, or SafeSeaNet, will connect all member states' maritime administrations.102 An
EU Long Range Identification and Tracking Data Centre will process long-range identifi-
cation and tracking information of ships out to one thousand nautical miles from Euro-
pean shores.i03
Directive 2009/18/EC establishes a common European framework for maritime acci-
dent investigations, seeking to guarantee the effectiveness, objectivity, and transparency of
investigations involving accidents in EU waters, EU flag ships, or EU financial inter-
ests.' 04 The Directive requires a harmonization of technical enquiry procedures, based on
the IMO Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents. Accident investi-
gations will be carried out independently of any judicial enquiries. 5s An information and
analysis system on accidents at sea will be established. The investigations are to be inde-
pendent of criminal or civil judicial proceedings, but not delayed or obstructed on that
account.
Regulation No. 392/2009 (EC) gives greater and harmonized legal protections to pas-
sengers involved in a maritime accident aboard a cruise ship or ferry. 0 6 The Regulation
97. See Council Directive No. 2009/16, OJ. L 131/57 (2009).
98. Id.
99. Id.




104. See Council Directive 2009/18, OJ. L 131/114 (2009) (establishing the fundamental principles gov-
erning the investigation of accidents in the maritime transport sector and amending Council Directive No.
1999/35 and Council Directive No. 2002/59).
105. Id.
106. See Council Regulation No. 392/2009, OJ. L 131/24 (2009).
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incorporates into Community law the 2002 Protocol to the 1974 Athens Convention Re-
lating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, adopted under the auspices
of the IMO. It will be phased in for different classes of passenger ships over a period of
several years. The Athens Convention provides for a system of strict liability of the carrier
in respect to loss or damage in the event of shipping incidents, while accidental injury will
continue to require a showing of fault. 0 7 The Convention lays down maximum compen-
sation amounts (C464,000 per passenger), requires all carriers to carry insurance, and al-
lows an injured party to claim direct compensation from the insurer. 08 The Regulation
also expands on the Athens Convention, in particular, by extending its scope to interna-
tional maritime transport and to main cabotage lines.
Finally, Directive 2009/20/EC changes insurance rules applicable to maritime trans-
port.'09 This Directive requires all ships flying the flag of an EU member state and all
ships entering a maritime area under the jurisdiction of an EU member state to have
insurance corresponding to the ceilings in the 1996 Protocol to the 1976 IMO Conven-
tion on the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims. 10 Proof of insurance is to be
provided by a commercial insurance certificate. A ship without a certificate may be de-
tained or expelled. National authorities are directed to establish penalties for non-compli-
ance. The Directive applies to ships of three hundred tons or more."' The provisions of
the Directive 2009/20/EC are to be effective no later than January 1, 2012.
B. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
The Commission launched a number of enforcement actions in the area of maritime
safety. On November 27, 2008, the Commission announced infringement actions against
Estonia and Italy for failing to fully transpose into national law Directive 2005/45/EC on
the mutual recognition of seafarers' certificates.1 2 On January 29, 2009, the Commission
sent reasoned opinions, the last step before an enforcement action, to Estonia, Latvia, and
France for failure to fully enforce the Directive 95/2 1/EC on port state control of ship-
ping, in particular, failure to apply sanctions for breaches or to charge full re-inspection
costs." 3 On April 14, 2009, the Commission sent similar reasoned opinions to Poland
and Spain, citing Poland for a failure to apply sanctions, and Spain for a lack of appropri-
ate qualifications for several port state inspectors." 4 On October 8, 2009, the Commis-
sion lodged a case against Italy before the European Court of Justice for failing to charge
full re-inspection costs for detained vessels." 5 The question of classification societies
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Council Directive No. 2009/20, OJ. L 131/128 (2009).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Council Directive No. 2005/45, OJ. L 255/160 (2005) (amending Council Directive No. 2001/25).
Commission action reported in RAPID IP/08/1809 (Nov. 27, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
ReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1809&language=en.
113. See Council Directive No. 95/21, OJ. L 157/1 (1995); see also RAPID IP/09/178 (Jan. 29, 2009), availa-
ble at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/178&language=en.
114. See RAPID IP/09/573 (Apr. 14, 2009), available at http-/europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer-
ence=IP/09/573&language=en.
115. See RAPID IP/09/1441 (Oct. 8, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?ref-
erence=IP/09/1441 &Ianguage=en.
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arose on June 25, 2009, when the Commission sent a reasoned opinion to Slovakia for
allowing a ship inspection and certification organization to operate which had applied for
recognition but had not been approved within the terms of Directive 1994/57/EC.116
C. TAXATION
The Commission took a number of decisions to make the EU flag more attractive and
to stimulate European shipping. On January 13, 2009, it approved a tonnage tax scheme
for Slovenia for eight years, whereby shipping companies fulfilling certain criteria can now
opt for a lump sum tax base calculated on the net tonnage of their fleet, instead of corpo-
rate income tax, for the taxation of profits of maritime trade."17 On February 25, 2009,
the Commission approved a modification to the Irish tonnage tax scheme relating to time-
chartered ships, increasing its coverage from a ratio of owned to time-chartered ships
from one in three, to one in ten, provided that every time-chartered ship is registered in
the Community or EEA, or its crew and technical management are carried out on Com-
munity or EEA territory.118 On March 10, 2009, the Commission approved changes to
the Dutch tonnage tax scheme to allow for a seventy-five percent reduction in the tonnage
tax base for shipping management companies designed to offset the lack of advantages for
such companies in establishing themselves in the Community because their tonnage tax
was substantially higher than that of ship-owners.I19 On June 10, 2009, the Commission
followed up this decision with a State Aid ruling that outsourced crew management and
technical management of ships will be eligible for treatment under tonnage tax rules
rather than corporate tax.120 Previously, only ship managers providing jointly technical
and crew management for the same ship were eligible for a tonnage tax scheme. To be
eligible, the ships must be fully compliant with international safety rules, including the
substantive provisions of the 2006 Maritime Labor Convention for crew managers, ahead
of its coming into force.121
D. MOTORWAYS OF THE SEA
The European Union launched its Motorways of the Sea (MoS) initiative in 2001, sup-
ported financially by the Marco Polo and trans-European transport network programs. It
encourages multi-modal transport in Europe and shifts long-distance transport off con-
gested roads and onto the sea. On December 11, 2008, the Commission announced a new
set of State Aid guidelines to encourage member state contributions to the MoS initia-
116. See RAPID IP/09/1024 (une 25, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?ref-
erence=IP/09/1024&fornat=HTML&aged=O&language=EN.
117. See RAPID IP/09/42 Gan. 13, 2009), available at http-//europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer-
ence=IP/09/42&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
118. See RAPID IP/09/319 (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?ref-
erence=IP/09/319&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en.
119. See RAPID IP/09/382 (Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?ref-
erence=LP/09/382&format=HTML&aged=O&Ianguage=en&guiLanguage=en.
120. See RAPID IP/09/900 Gune 10, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?ref-
erence=IP/09/900.
121. Id.
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tive.122 Under the new rules, member states may provide aid for operational costs of
Marco Polo selected projects up to thirty-five percent for five years, and aid to start-up
investments in TEN-T MoS projects up to thirty percent for two years.123
Four MoS corridors have been designated for establishment by 2010: (1) a Motorway
of the Baltic Sea, linking the Baltic Sea Member States with Central and Western Europe;
(2) a Motorway of the Sea of Western Europe from Portugal and Spain via the Atlantic
Arc to the North Sea and the Irish Sea; (3) a Motorway of the Sea of South-East Europe
connecting the Adriatic to the Ionian Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean; and (4) a Mo-
torway of the Sea of South-West Europe, connecting Spain, France, Italy, and Malta, with
links to South-East Europe and the Black Sea.124 To make the MoS system effective,
however, hard choices will need to be made on the rationalization of multi-modal trade
flows, corridors, and services.
VI. Rotterdam Rules on International Sea Cargo Opened for Signature
On September 23, 2009, representatives of the United States and fifteen other countries
convened at Rotterdam, the Netherlands, to sign the U.N. Convention on Contracts for
the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea.125 The Convention had
been drafted over a twelve-year period by an UNCITRAL working group and had been
approved by the U.N. General Assembly on December 11, 2008.126 If ratified by twenty
countries, the Convention (the Rotterdam Rules) would take effect one year later for
cargo moving to or from those countries in ocean or combined ocean-inland carriage. 127
The Rotterdam Rules would apply in different ways to carriers and performing parties.
A carrier, defined as a person executing a contract of carriage with a shipper, regardless of
whether that person directly provides any of the physical transportation,128 would operate
under a uniform set of liability and other rules for the ocean carriage and any inland
carriage covered by the same contract.129 A maritime performing party, meaning a sub-
contracted vessel operator or a person providing storage, stevedoring, and related services
in a port area,130 generally would be subject to the same treaty-based rules as the Rotter-




125. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Law, Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly
or Partly by Sea, U.N. Doc. E.09.V9 (2009), available at http://www.mcgill.ca/files/maritimelaw/Rotter-
damRules.pdf [hereinafter Rotterdam Rules] (The 16 first-day signatories included major seafaring and trad-
ing nations such as Norway, Greece, France, the Netherlands, and the United States); See also Press Release,
Port of Rotterdam, Acceptance of Rotterdam Rules by 16 Countries (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://www.
portofrotterdam.com/en/news/pressreleases/2009/ 2 009 09 2 3_0 2 .jsp (Since September 23, the number of sig-
natories has increased to twenty according to a private communication received by co-author Mark J. An-
drews on November 8, 2009 from Richard M. Leslie, a delegate to the ABA House of Delegates for the U.S.
Maritime Law Association.).
126. For a detailed history of the UNCITRAL drafting process, see Michael F. Sturley, Transportation Law
for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction to the Preparation, Philosophy, and Potential Impact of the Rotterdam
Rules, 14 J. INT'L MAR. L. 461, 464-467 (2008) [hereinafter Sturley I].
127. See Rotterdam Rules, supra note 125, arts. 5(1), 94(1).
128. Id. art. 1(5).
129. Id. arts. 1(1), 1(5).
130. Id. art. 1(7).
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dam "carrier."' 3' Other performing parties, such as trucking companies and railroads not
operating entirely within a port, could be brought within the new treaty regime only by
contract,132 just as under current law.133
The Rotterdam Rules thus embody an evolutionary approach toward uniform in-
termodal liability, but would not eliminate all the mode-based inconsistencies that now
foster complexity in cargo law. In particular, Rotterdam would not resolve the current
split of authority on whether a multimodal carrier and a shipper can contract for a door-
to-door liability limitation on an international shipment without regard to the strictures of
U.S. inland transportation law.134 Ironically, U.S. inland carriers successfully opposed in-
cluding their modes in the new treaty during the UNCITRAL process. 35 Had they fore-
seen the current dueling precedents on door-to-door liability, they might have taken a
different tack.
Rotterdam also would introduce incremental reforms in other areas of cargo liability
law.136 These changes would include:
* Abolition of a carrier's right to invoke the notorious error-of-navigation defense-a
holdover from the days when a ship was out of communication with vessel owners
once it sailed over the horizon.'37
* Increase in the default amount of a carrier's liability limitation (under U.S. law) from
the current level of $500 per package to 875 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) per
package-an increase of more than two hundred percent. Rotterdam also would cre-
ate an alternative limitation of three SDRs per kilogram, or around $2.00 per pound.
The higher of the two limits would apply to any given loss, and the shipper's existing
right to declare a higher value would be preserved.138
* Clarification of the shipper's right to have each shipping unit on a pallet treated as a
separate package, if the number of such units is specified on the shipping
documents.' 39
131. Id. art. 19.
132. See Michael F. Sturley, Modernizing and Reforming U.S. Maritime Law: The Impact of the Rotterdam Rules
in the United States, 44 TEX. INT'L L.J. 427, 448-450 (2009) [hereinafter Sturley II].
133. See Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30701(Sec. 1)(e), (Sec. 3)(7) (2006) [hereinafter
COGSAI.
134. Compare Norfolk S. Ry. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14 (2004) (holding that liability limitations in a through bill
of lading issued by an Australian freight forwarder were binding on all segments of a shipment handled by
ocean and rail carriers to a U.S. inland destination) with Sompo Japan Ins. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 456 F.3d
54 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding in effect that the U.S. Supreme Court must have overlooked a U.S. statutory
requirement for railroads to offer a "full liability" option to their customers). Sompo was followed by the
Ninth Circuit in Regal-Beloit Corp. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., 557 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2009), in which
certiorari has been granted (U.S. Nos. 08-1553, 08-1554).
135. See Sturley I, supra note 126, at 478 nn. 184-87.
136. For a detailed comparison of Rotterdam and COGSA on liability issues, maritime practitioners will
want to read the entirety of Sturley II, supra note 132. Because of space limitations, the present discussion is
intended merely to bring highlights of Rotterdam's proposed reforms to the attention of international lawyers
who occasionally encounter cargo issues.
137. Compare COGSA § 4(2)(a), supra note 133, with Rotterdam Rules, supra note 125, art. 17(3).
138. Compare COGSA § 4(5), supra note 133, with Rotterdam Rules, supra note 125, art. 59(1); see also
Sturley II, supra note 132, at 436-42.
139. Rotterdam Rules, supra note 125, art. 59(2).
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* Significant alleviation of the so-called "Sky Reefer" problem presented by foreign
arbitration clauses,'o if the United States opts into Rotterdam provisions on jurisdic-
tion and arbitration. Except in the case of certain volume contracts, these provisions
would protect U.S. shippers from having to pursue cargo litigation or arbitration in a
distant country pursuant to the fine print of a bill of lading.141
* Liberalization of key deadlines: two years for a suit on a cargo claim rather than a
year under current law,142 and seven days for notice of concealed damage rather than
the current three days.143
Beyond the realm of cargo liability, the Rotterdam Rules also would facilitate the crea-
tion, transfer, and enforcement of electronic transportation documents.144 In U.S. do-
mestic law, this same ground was traversed by the 2003 revision of Article 7 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC-7).14S Fortunately, it is evident that the drafters of
UCC-7 were aware of the ongoing UNCITRAL project,'" so that conflicts between the
two instruments appear minimal. UCC-7 recognizes the supremacy of federal law (in-
cluding ratified treaties).147 Accordingly, its rules on bills of lading have been largely dis-
placed by pre-emptive U.S. federal statutes even without Rotterdam.14 8 While UCC-7
rules on warehouse receipts address an area largely controlled by state law, there will be
minimal conflict even here because Rotterdam addresses warehouse issues only tangen-
tially.149 The one exception is warehousing in port areas, where the Rotterdam Rules on
liability of maritime performing parties will apply in lieu of UCC-7 or other state laws.150
Education of the warehousing community about this change will be necessary if and when
the Rotterdam Rules enter into force.
140. See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
141. Rotterdam Rules, supra note 125, arts. 66-78.
142. Compare COGSA § 3(6), supra note 133, with Rotterdam Rules, supra note 125, art. 62(1).
143. Compare COGSA § 3(6), supra note 133, with Rotterdam Rules, supra note 125, art. 23(1).
144. Rotterdam Rules, supra note 125, arts. 8-10, 35-42, 50-58.
145. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, FACTS ABOUT THE
REVISED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 7 (2003), http://nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/
uniformacts-fs-ucc7.asp. The revised UCC-7 has been adopted by at least 36 States.
146. See, e.g., Comments to sec. 7-105 of UCC-7 draft as adopted by Uniform Law Commissioners in 2003.
147. U.C.C. § 7-103(a) (2003).
148. U.S. carriers of all modes already are covered by broad federal preemption. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 10501(b)
(railroads), 14501 (motor carriers and inland forwarders), and 41713 (air carriers); see also U.S. Const. Art. m,
§ 2, cl. (1) (granting exclusive maritime jurisdiction to federal courts).
149. The statutory and constitutional provisions referenced, Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 40, gen-
erally do not apply to warehouses.
150. See Rotterdam Rules, supra note 125, art. 1(6)(a), which includes "handling, stowage [and] care" of
goods in the definitional universe of duties assigned to a performing party.
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